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Abstract. Certificate validation is one of the toughest scalability prob-
lems of the PKI. The goal of this paper is to introduce a Java platform
for certificate revocation called CERVANTES. CERVANTES pretends
to be an easy to extend tool that allows researchers to develop and test
their own “real” revocation systems. As CERVANTES is an open source
project it can also be included as part of any open PKI project. The
platform is very flexible and due to its modular design it allows for ex-
ample, to fit a new kind of status checking protocol without having to
recompile the source code. CERVANTES includes our implementations
of the main standards (CRLs and OCSP) as well as an implementation
of a system based on the Merkle Hash Tree (one of the most popular
systems among the non-standard ones). Finally, we use CERVANTES to
obtain performance results about each developped system. These results
guarantee that CERVANTES runs as expected.
1 Introduction
The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is responsible for the Identity Certiﬁcates
(ICs) not only at the issuing time but also during the whole life-time of the
certiﬁcate. An IC has a bounded life-time: it is not valid prior to the activation
date and it is not valid beyond the expiration date. In this context, certiﬁcate
revocation can be deﬁned as “the mechanism under which an issuer can inval-
idate the binding between an identity and a public-key before the expiration of
the corresponding certificate”. Thus, the existence of a certiﬁcate is a necessary
but not suﬃcient evidence for its validity, the PKI needs to provide applica-
tions that use certiﬁcates with the ability to check, at the time of usage, that
the certiﬁcate is still valid1. Figure 1 presents the reference model that we use
to describe the certiﬁcate revocation paradigm. Regarding the PKIX model [5],
our reference model removes what it is not directly involved in the revocation
and it depicts the entities and the mechanisms that are directly related to the
revocation process in more detail.
 This work has been supported by the Spanish Research Council under the project
ARPA (TIC2003-08184-C02-02) and the European Research Council under the
project UBISEC (IST-FP6 506926).
1 Actually, the validation of a certificate comprises another mechanism: the certifica-
tion path validation, but our platform currently does not address this feature.
S.K. Katsikas et al. (Eds.): EuroPKI 2004, LNCS 3093, pp. 28–42, 2004.
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Fig. 1. Revocation Reference Model
The revocation process starts with a request to revoke a certain certiﬁcate.
Usually, the owner of the certiﬁcate to be revoked, an authorized representative
or the issuer CA, can create revocation requests, but, in general, a Certiﬁcation
Practice Statement (CPS) should deﬁne who is able to perform this task in each
PKI domain. To revoke the certiﬁcate, one of the authorized entities generates a
revocation request and sends it to the Revocation Data Issuer (RDI). RDI2 is the
term that we use to deﬁne the Trusted Third Party (TTP) that has the master
database of revoked certiﬁcates. The RDI is also responsible for transforming the
revocation records from the database into “status data”. The status data has
the appropriate format in order to be distributed to the End Entities (EEs). The
status data usually includes the following ﬁelds: Certificate Issuer (the Distin-
guished Name or DN of the CA that issued the target certiﬁcate or certiﬁcates),
Validity Period (this period of time bounds the status data life-time and it is ob-
viously smaller than the validity period of the certiﬁcate), Issuer Name (the DN
of the TTP that issued the status data), Cryptographic Evidence (the evidence
must demonstrate that the status data was issued by a TTP), Serial Number
(the serial number of the target certiﬁcate or certiﬁcates), Revocation Date (the
date when the target certiﬁcate was revoked), and optionally the Reason Code
(a revocation reason for guidance can be speciﬁed). In the vast majority of the
revocation systems, EEs do not have a straight connection to the RDI. Instead
of this, the RDI publishes the status data in “repositories” or ”responders”. The
main function of both repositories and responders is to answer the EE requests
concerning the status of certiﬁcates (status checking). The diﬀerence between
them is that repositories are non-TTPs that store status data pre-computed by
the RDI while responders are TTPs that have a private-key and that provide
a signature (that serves as cryptographic evidence) for each response. It must
be stressed that status checking is the most resource-consuming mechanism in
2 The CA that issued the certificate is often the one that performs the RDI functions
for the certificate, but these functions can be delegated to an independent TTP.
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the overall revocation process and the one that carries the major part of the
interoperability problems.
This paper introduces CERVANTES, a Java platform for certiﬁcate revoca-
tion. CERVANTES pretends to be an easy to extend tool that helps researchers
to develop and test their own real revocation systems. As CERVANTES is an
open source software project, it can also be included as part of any open PKI
project. One of the main design goals for us was to make CERVANTES easy to
extend. For this reason, CERVANTES has a modular design and well-deﬁned
APIs between each of its modules. The ﬁnal platform is very ﬂexible and due
to this modular design and it allows for example, to ﬁt a new kind of status
checking protocol without having to recompile the source code.
Currently, CERVANTES includes our implementations of the main stan-
dards (CRLs [16] and OCSP [14]) as well as an implementation of a system
based on the Merkle Hash Tree [13] (one of the most popular approaches among
the non-standard systems). In this paper, we use CERVANTES to obtain some
performance results about each developped system. These results permit us to
check that the platform behaves as expected. However, as a reviewer noticed, the
goal of CERVANTES is not to provide results that can be obtained with sim-
ple pen-and-paper calculations3. CERVANTES pretends to be a tool to perform
tests in a wide sense, including real implementations, protocols and interoper-
ability issues4. The basic JAVA structure of CERVANTES was published in [9]
and more evaluation results with CERVANTES can be found in [11]. This paper
deals with the logical organization of the platform, including the functions of
each module and the interrelations between modules. The rest of the paper is
organized as follows: in Section 2 we present the main approaches to certiﬁcate
status checking. In Section 3 we present CERVANTES (Certiﬁcate Validation
Test-bed). In Section 4 we validate the behaviour of CERVANTES for the main
status checking mechanisms. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
2 Related Work
There are many approaches that deﬁne the data format to be exchanged with
the End Entities to perform the status checking. The simplest of them is the tra-
ditional Certificate Revocation List (CRL) [6]. CRL is the most mature approach
and it has been part of X.509 since its ﬁrst version. CRL has also been proﬁled
for the Internet in [5]. A CRL is a digitally signed list of revoked certiﬁcates in
which for each entry within the list the following information is stored: the certiﬁ-
cate serial number, the revocation reason and the revocation date. The CRL has
3 In this sense, some models have been proposed to evaluate PKI components in
general and the certificate revocation in particular. For instance, in [10] we presented
an analytical way of modeling revocation, while in [3], Arnes presents a simulation
model. However, in our opinion a model or a simulator can not address all the aspects
of a real system and it might overlook important details.
4 Although we have performed some interoperability tests with other systems, these
tests are not presented here due to the room limitation.
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also a header that includes information about the version, the CRL serial num-
ber, the issuer, the algorithm used to sign, the signature, the issuing date, the
expiration date and some optional ﬁelds called extensions. The CA that issued
the certiﬁcate acts as RDI and repositories can be used to distribute the CRLs.
Since CRLs may have a large size, they are usually cached by the client during
their validity period. Overissued CRL (O-CRL) [4] addresses a way of reducing
the peak request rate of CRLs towards the repositories and evenly distribute the
requests across time. O-CRL simply consists in issuing more than just one CRL
during a validity period. The result will be that the CRLs in relying parties’
caches will expire at diﬀerent times, so requests to the repository for new CRLs
will be more spread out. Delta-CRL (D-CRL) [6] is an attempt to reduce the size
of the CRLs. A Delta-CRL is a small CRL that provides information about the
certiﬁcates whose status have changed since the issuance of a complete list called
Base-CRL. CRL-Distribution Points (CRL-DP) was introduced in the version 3
of X.509 [6]. In CRL-DP, each CRL contains the status information of a certain
subgroup of certiﬁcates. Each subgroup is associated with a CRL distribution
point, which can be located on the same or diﬀerent repositories. Each certiﬁcate
has a pointer to the location of its CRL distribution point, so there is no need
to either search through distribution points or have a priori knowledge of the
revocation information locations. The criteria for creating these subgroups can
be geographic, by their level of importance, scope of use, etc.
The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [14] has been proposed by
the PKIX workgroup of the IETF. In OCSP the status of certiﬁcates is available
in responders through a request/response mechanism. An OCSP client issues a
status request for a particular certiﬁcate and sends it to an OCSP responder. The
acceptance of the certiﬁcate in question is suspended until the responder provides
a response. Upon receipt of a request, the responder determines whether the
request is correct, searches the status information in its local database (which can
be a CRL), creates a response with the corresponding data, signs this response
and sends it back to the client.
The Certificate Revocation Tree (CRT) [7] and the Authenticated Dictionary
(AD) [15] are both based on the Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) [8]. The MHT relies
on the properties of the OWHF (One Way Hash Functions). It exploits the fact
that a OWHF is at least 10,000 times faster to compute than a digital signature,
so the majority of the cryptographic operations performed in the revocation
system are hash functions instead of digital signatures. In [13] we present the
details of a revocation system called AD-MHT, which is based on the MHT and
the data structures proposed in [15].
3 CERVANTES
CERVANTES5 is based on a client/server architecture where the clients are
the EEs that perform the status checking and the revocations and the server
5 The home of CERVANTES is located at http://isg.upc.es/cervantes
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performs the functions of the RDI, the responders and the repositories. The
software is organized in three parts: the Client, the Server and the Library.
Below, we describe them.
3.1 The Library
The Library implements the functions that are common to the clients and the
server and it is necessary to run all of them. Among the Library functions the
most important is to provide the ASN.1 support for both clients and server. As
CERVANTES is built in Java, we need to convert the ASN.1 PDU deﬁnitions
into Java classes. In order to perform this conversion, the ASN.1 deﬁnition ﬁle
of the PDU is used as input to an ASN.1-to-Java stub compiler. In particular,
we use Snacc4Java v2.3 [1]. In computer security, ASN.1 data are normally en-
coded using the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [17] because these rules
give exactly one way to represent any ASN.1 value as a bit-pattern. Thus, DER is
appropriate for applications in which a unique bit-pattern encoding is needed, as
is the case when a digital signature is computed on an ASN.1 value. In our case,
the Snacc4Java libraries let us perform the DER encoding of the ASN.1 objects.
DER encoded PDUs can be sent using many operational mechanisms such as raw
sockets, HTTP, FTP, LDAP, SMTP, and X.500. So far, CERVANTES only sup-
ports raw-sockets and HTTP. However, this already does not imply a great loss
of inter-operability because HTTP is the most widely spread transport mecha-
nism among the PKI products. When HTTP is used as operational protocol, the
HTTP header contains the Content-Type set to the proper MIME type and the
Content-Length set to the total length in bytes (including the header), while
the body contains the bit-pattern corresponding to the DER encoded PDU.
3.2 The Server
The server is the most complex part of CERVANTES and it is organized in four
modules: the Input/Output (I/O), the Database (DB), the Central Management
(CM) and the Status Checking Handlers (SCHs).
The DATABASE MODULE (DB)
This module contains the classes necessary to retrieve, add, delete or modify the
information that contains the database. The database is extern to CERVANTES.
Any SQL-based database that can be accessed though the JDBC API can be
used. In particular, we have chosen PostgreSQL v7.2.2 because it is very stable
and it is an open source project as CERVANTES. The main function of the DB
module is to provide an API to perform the operations related to the database.
This API deﬁnes all the functions that are required by the rest of the modules of
the system. These functions permit to retrieve all the records from the database,
ask for the number of records that has the database, ﬁgure out if a certain
record is stored in the database, delete all the records of the database, insert a
revocation record (revoke a certiﬁcate), and delete a revocation record (remove
a record of an expired certiﬁcate).
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The INPUT/OUTPUT MODULE (I/O)
The I/O module manages the database inputs (revocations) and outputs (expi-
rations). The I/O can be conﬁgured to run in two modes:
– Standard mode. In this mode CERVANTES can be used as a standard revo-
cation platform, that is, it receives requests from authorized entities to revoke
certiﬁcates and it responds to requests about the status of certiﬁcates. The
protocol to revoke a certiﬁcate that we use is the Simple Certiﬁcate Revo-
cation Protocol (SCRP) [9]. SCRP is a lightweight version of CMP [2] that
we have developped. We do not use straight CMP because it agglutinates
much functionality that is beyond the needs of a revocation system (and this
makes CMP diﬃcult to implement).
– Test mode. In this mode, random inputs are used, and CERVANTES pro-
vides information that allows us to test the systems without having real
users.
From now on, we will focus on the second run mode where the revoked and
expired certiﬁcates are randomly generated. The random generation process can
be controlled by conﬁguring the certiﬁcates population (i.e. the number of cer-
tiﬁcates ”N”), the percentage of revoked certiﬁcates ”r” and the average rate of
events ”λevents”. When a test is running, two execution threads: the revocations
generator and the expirations generator, are in charge of generating radom re-
vocations and random expirations at the correct average rate. The generation of
random events is divided in two phases:
(1) Static phase. In this phase the revocations generator works at a very high
rate whereas the expirations generator remains in standby. The tests are always
started with an empty database and basically the objective of this phase is to
ﬁll with revocation records the database until the average number of revoked
certiﬁcates ”n” is reached: n = N ∗ r.
(2) Dynamic phase. Once the database has reached the average number of
revoked certiﬁcates, the I/O module reduces the rate of the revocations generator
and starts the expirations generator with a proper rate in order to keep the
system dynamic and stable. The objective is insert and delete records in the
database at a rate λevents.
Notice that as the target certiﬁcate for either a revocation or an expiration
is randomly chosen, there are events that do not have any eﬀect. For instance,
nothing will happen if the revocations generator generates a revoked certiﬁcate
that is already contained in the database or if the expirations generator generates
an expiration for a certiﬁcate that it is not in the database. It follows from the
previous discussion that the average rate of events of the revocation generator
”λrevocations” must be λevents/(1 − r). While the average rate of events of the
expirations generator ”λexpirations” must be λevents/r. The random events are
generated following an exponential probability density function, where the time
between events t is obtained by means of a uniform variable ”x”, where x ∈ [0, 1]
x = 1− eλt ⇒ t = − 1
λ
ln(1− x) (1)
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Once an event is generated, the I/O module sends the information related
with it to the CM module.
The CENTRAL MANAGEMENT MODULE (CM)
The CM module is the one that reads the conﬁguration ﬁle and initiates the
server. The CM also creates a log ﬁle in which it will store all the traces of the
execution of the server such as the time the server is started, the name of the
host, the modules it has found, the running mode etc. Depending on the running
mode the CM starts the proper I/O execution threads. The CM also initiates
the JDBC connection and creates the main execution threads (PortThreads) of
each SCH found in the conﬁguration ﬁle.
While the server is running, the CM receives the revocations/expirations
from the I/O and it inserts/deletes the records related with the new events in the
database. The CM also informs the SCHs about the new events and periodically
orders the SCHs to dump and reset their statistic counters. When the server
must be stopped, the CM kills all the execution threads.
The STATUS CHECKING HANDLERS (SCHs)
The SCHs are the most complex modules in the platform and they contain the
logic necessary to send the status data in the proper format to the EEs. Figure 2
depicts the organization and the transactions that take place among the diﬀerent
elements of a generic SCH.
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Fig. 2. Generic Status Checking Handler (SCH) organization.
1. Each SCH has a “PortThread” which is an independent execution thread
that listens for requests addressed to a certain TCP port.
2. The SCHs are able to serve several requests at the same time, to do so the
PortThread creates an independent execution thread for each request called
“SocketThread”.
3. The SocketThread receives the data of the request and builds a proper re-
sponse.
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4. The SocketThread can obtain the status data required to build the PDU of
the response from the database.
5. The SocketThread can also obtain the status data required to build the PDU
of the response from a local cache.
6. The StatusDataUpdater is an execution thread that periodically asks for the
PortThread to update the cache.
7. The CM informs the database and all the PortThreads about each new event
(expiration/revocation) that occurs in the system. This fresh information can
be used by the PortThreads to update their caches.
8. For the PortThread another way to update its cache is to access the previ-
ously recorded data that is stored in the database.
9. The PortThread updates the cache when the StatusDataUpdater gives the
order to do so.
10. Once the SocketThread has all the necessary data (from either the database
or the local cache), it sends the response back to the client.
11. Finally the SocketThread informs the PortThread about the bytes and pro-
cessing time required to serve the request.
The conﬁguration parameters of a generic SCH are presented in Figure 3.
type of server. This is a string that identities the protocol of SCH.
class of server. This identifies the class that implements the status server. With
this parameter a developer can add new status checking protocols to CERVANTES
without having to recompile the code.
name. This is a string that gives a name to the SCH.
operational protocol. This is the underlying protocol that will transport the status
data. This can be HTTP, raw or ¡auto-detect¿. With the last configuration the server
will detect and use the operational protocol used by the client.
port. The number of TCP port used to listen to requests.
server log. This is the path to the file that stores the traces of the execution of the
status server for debugging.
statistics log. This is the path to the file that stores the statistics taken by the
status server.
certificate path. This is the path to the certificate used to sign the PDUs by SCH.
private key path. This is the path to the file that stores the private key associated
with the certificate of the SCH.
Fig. 3. Conﬁguration parameters of a generic SCH server.
Next, we particularize the behaviour of the generic SCH for status checking
with CRLs, OCSP and MHT.
CRL-SCH . Our implementation of CRL allows the overissuation of CRLs
so besides the validity period ”V P” of the CRLs, it is necessary to deﬁne the
overissuation factor ”O”. This means that ”O” CRLs will be issued during a
V P .
Figure 4 shows the behaviour of the SCH that manages the CRL
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1. The CRLPortThread listens for requests addressed to a certain TCP port.
2. For each request the CRLPortThread creates a CRLSocketThread.
3. The CRLSocketThread receives the request.
4. The CRLSocketThread retrieves the CRL from the cache.
5. The CRLSocketThread sends the CRL to the client.
6. The CRLSocketThread informs the CRLPortThread about the bytes and
processing time required to serve the request.
7. Every V P/O the StatusDataUpdater asks the PortThread to update the
CRL.
8. The CRLPortThread retrieves all the records from the database.
9. With all the status data retrieved, the CRLPortThread generates the list of
revoked certiﬁcates, sets the validity period, signs the CRL, DER encodes
the CRL and sends the result to the Cache.
OCSP-SCH . Figure 5 shows the behaviour of the SCH that manages the OCSP.
DB
OCSP−SCH
1
53
2
6
4
. . .
. . .
OCSP client OCSP client
OCSPSocketThreadOCSPSocketThread
OCSPPortThread
Fig. 5. OCSP-SCH
1. The OCSPPortThread listens for requests addressed to a certain TCP
port.
2. For each request the OCSPPortThread creates an OCSPSocketThread.
3. The OCSPSocketThread receives the request.
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4. The OCSPSocketThread retrieves the status data for the requested certiﬁ-
cate from the DB.
5. With the status data the OCSPSocketThread builds the response including
the signature, DER encodes the response and sends it to the client.
6. The OCSPSocketThread informs the OCSPPortThread about the bytes and
processing time required to serve the request.
MHT-SCH . Our MHT-based implementation is called AD-MHT [13]. We have
also developped an ASN.1 protocol for AD-MHT [12]. Figure 6 shows the be-
haviour of the SCH that manages AD-MHT.
1. The ADMHTPortThread listens for requests addressed to a certain TCP
port.
2. For each request the ADMHTPortThread creates an ADMHTSocket-
Thread.
3. The ADMHTSocketThread receives the request.
4. The Cache stores two MHTs: the “listening tree” and the “management
tree”. The listening tree is used by the SCH to respond for status check-
ing requests and it is immutable during the validity period of the Digest.
The management tree is updated for each expiration/revocation and after a
validity period ”V P” the management tree is cloned and the listening tree
is replaced with the clone. Thus, the ADMHTSocketThread retrieves the
status data (Digest+Path) from the listening tree stored in Cache.
5. The ADMHTSocketThread sends the response to the client.
Status Data
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53
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ADMHT client ADMHT client
ADMHTSocketThreadADMHTSocketThread
ADMHTPortThread
CM
clone()
Fig. 6. ADMHT-SCH
6. The ADMHTSocketThread informs the ADMHTPortThread about the bytes
and processing time required to serve the request.
7. The CM informs the ADMHTPortThread about any change in the status
data.
8. When the ADMHTPortThread is informed about a change in the status data
(revocation/expiration) it must update the management tree.
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9. Every V P the StatusDataUpdater asks the ADMHTPortThread to clone
the management tree.
10. The ADMHTPortThread clones the management tree and signs the Digest
of the new listening tree.
11. If CERVANTES is restarted and it must keep the revocation records from a
previous execution, the ADMHTPortThread has to build the “ﬁrst” MHT
based on these records. So it retrieves all the recorded status data from the
database and builds this ﬁrst listening tree. If CERVANTES is started with
an empty database, the listening tree will also be empty.
12. The ADMHTSocketThread sends the ﬁrst listening tree to the Cache.
3.3 The Clients
The clients are entities able to send requests and process responses using a par-
ticular protocol. CERVANTES implements each protocol as a module and each
module provides a java API. Any application can use these APIs to perform the
necessary client-side operations on behalf of a certiﬁcate-using application. Basi-
cally the protocol modules send requests with the parameters speciﬁed through
their API, set a timeout and wait for a response from the server. The communi-
cation is closed and a “timeout fail” is reported through the API if the response
does not arrive prior to the end of the timeout. If a response is received on time,
it is veriﬁed and the result is reported through the API. Using the APIs of the
diﬀerent protocol modules, we have developped two applications: a graphical
client and a test client. Below, we describe in more detail the test client.
The test client is a multi-threaded application in which each execution thread
represents a client that generates random status checking requests. The aim of
the test client is to analyze the behaviour of each status checking protocol or
a combination of them under diﬀerent conditions. In order to perform a test
we deﬁne “groups of clients”. A group of clients is a determinate number of
execution threads (clients) with the same conﬁguration. To deﬁne a group of
clients we need to specify the URL of the server (name/@IP and TCP port)
where the requests must be addressed. We also need to deﬁne the statistics of
the requests. The statistic used is an exponential probability density function in
time. In the conﬁguration ﬁle you can set the number of clients ”n” and average
rate of requests per hour and client ”λrequests”.
4 Evaluation with Cervantes
A few requirements can be deﬁned to evaluate revocation systems:
Population Size. The absolute size of the number of potentially revocable
certiﬁcates can strongly inﬂuence the approach taken. Obviously, a solution in-
tended to address a large population may require more resources and complexity
as compared to a smaller group.
Latency . The degree of timeliness relates to the interval between when a RDI
made a revocation record and when it made the information available to the
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relying parties. A more eager mechanism to update and convey this information
will proportionally consume more bandwidth.
Connectivity . Does the relying party need to be online in order to ascertain the
reliability? Online mechanisms create critical components in the overall security
design because they make diﬃcult to ensure that the system is operational and
functional at any given moment.
Finally, it is also worth mentioning that status checking is the mechanism that
has the greatest impact on the overall performance of the certiﬁcate revocation
system. Therefore, a status checking needs to be fast, eﬃcient and timely, and
it must scale well too. It is therefore necessary to minimize two fundamental
parameters: the processing capacity and the bandwidth (the amount of data
transmitted). In this section we use the CERVANTES platform to evaluate the
main status checking mechanisms: CRLs, OCSP and MHT. The experimental
results have been obtained under the following conditions: the CERVANTES
server runs in a Pentium III with Linux, the clients generate status checking
requests per hour following an exponential probability density function, each
client has a certiﬁcate, there is an average of 10% revocation, the validity period
of a CRL is 6 hours, the CRLs are cached by clients during their validity period,
clients will request their local cache instead of the repository if they have a
cached CRL, and the launching of the test clients is distributed along the ﬁrst
validity period.
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Fig. 7. Temporal evolution of OCSP vs CRL.
Figure 7 shows the temporal behaviour of the Overissued-CRL (with an
overissuation factor: O = 16) and the OCSP in terms of downlink bandwidth and
processing time in the repository/responder (using the conﬁguration previously
described). The results show evidence of the bottlenecks of each system: while
in the CRL system the ﬁgure of the downlink bandwidth is over an order of
magnitude bigger than in the OCSP, it happens the contrary in the ﬁgure of the
processing time.
Figure 8 shows the comparison among O-CRL, OCSP and AD-MHT. No-
tice that despite the use of cache, the CRL performance in terms of down-link
bandwidth is very poor compared to OCSP or AD-MHT. As a result, CRLs
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Fig. 8. Scalability regarding the number of clients: AD-MHT versus O-CRL and
OCSP
do not seem the best choice for distribution of status data among end users
and they should be only used as the distribution mechanism for intermediate
entities. OCSP is a good choice in terms of bandwidth but the processing capac-
ity resources it uses are the highest of the evaluated systems. Also, responders
are needed in order to distribute the OCSP data. AD-MHT bandwidth perfor-
mance is slightly worse than that of OCSP, but taking into account the overall
performance, the AD-MHT might be a good choice for distribution of status
data among end users because it does not require much bandwidth or process-
ing capacity and repositories (non-TTPs) can be used to respond to AD-MHT
requests.
5 Conclusions
This paper introduces CERVANTES, a Java platform for certiﬁcate revocation.
CERVANTES pretends to be an easy to extend tool that allows researchers to
develop and test their own real revocation systems. As CERVANTES is an open
source project it can also be included as part of any open PKI project. The
platform is very ﬂexible: it allows to ﬁt new status checking protocols and new
type of tests without signiﬁcative changes in the structure or the source code.
CERVANTES includes our implementations of the main standards (CRLs and
OCSP) as well as an implementation of a system based on the Merkle Hash Tree
(one of the most popular approaches among the non-standard ones). We have
also used CERVANTES to obtain performance results about each developped
system. The results obtained permit us to aﬃrm that the platform behaves as
expected. It is also worth to mention that CERVANTES is still an open project
and we are working into making the software publicly-avaliable.
As future work, it should be interesting to present more results regarding
other issues such as usability, management or as a reviewer pointed out, other
input patterns rather than random, for example, to study the behaviour of the
revocation systems in a situation like a denial of service attack.
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It is worth to mention that CERVANTES is still an open project and that
more development is currently going on, such as the division of server’s program
into diﬀerent programs: one for the revocation data issuer and one for the re-
sponder and the repository. Finally, we are also working to include certiﬁcation
path validation in the platform.
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